

Something Interesting

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ccNSO Technical Day
Sydney 2009



Agenda

- ⌚ Rethinking EPP
- ⌚ NSCP/DCOMA- standards for nameservers
- ⌚ Phishing URLs and how we might manage them
- ⌚ What now for DNS with DNSSEC on the horizon

The world before EPP - part 1

- ❧ Cryptographic signatures
 - ❧ Non-repudiation and tamper-proofing
 - ❧ No concerns on source IP address
 - ❧ Registrar responsible for key security
 - ❧ EPP - passwords and SSL - backward step
- ❧ Local data models
 - ❧ Fit with local need or requirements
 - ❧ e.g. Registrant type, identification numbers
 - ❧ Allows innovation and experimentation
 - ❧ Does make it harder for registrars though
 - ❧ EPP - single (thin registry) data model

The world before EPP - part 2

- ☞ Control and manageability
 - ☞ Each controlled our own interface
 - ☞ Could add/change/remove as we liked
 - ☞ Even harder for registrars of course
 - ☞ EPP - horrible extension mechanism
 - ☞ EPP - opaque process for change (IETF group that does not officially exist)
- ☞ Not really cross-registry provisioning
 - ☞ Federations may be our future

Rethinking EPP - part 1

- Adding cryptographic signatures
 - Easy, lots of XML apps do this
 - PGP in special tags <pgp></pgp>
 - S/MIME as used in XMPP (Jabber)
 - SAMLv2.0 HTTP POST 'SimpleSign' Binding
 - Detached PGP signatures (as per .nz DNRS)
 - BUT NOT XML-Dsig - complete disaster
 - <http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/xmlsec.txt>

XMPP S/MIME Method

- ⌚ <presence to="receiver">
 - ⌚ <e2 xmlns="...">
 - ⌚ <![CDATA[
 - ⌚ S/MIME message
 - ⌚ S/MIME header for two sections
 - ⌚ Section 1 - Full XML document of presence info
 - ⌚ Section 2 - S/MIME signature
 - ⌚ End of S/MIME
 - ⌚]]>
 - ⌚ </e2e>
- ⌚ </presence>

.nz DNRS Method

- ⌚ <!DOCTYPE NZSRSRequest SYSTEM "protocol.dtd">
- ⌚ <NZSRSRequest RegistrarId="90">
 - ⌚ <DomainCreate>
 - ⌚ ... details here
 - ⌚ </DomainCreate>
- ⌚ </NZSRSRequest>
- ⌚ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 - ⌚ ... signature data ...
- ⌚ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Rethinking EPP - part 2

- Supporting a local data model
 - More complicated but still achievable
 - Make EPP describe the data, not define it
 - Create default description of currently defined data -> backwards compatibility

Rethinking EPP - part 3

Easy extensions

- XML-Schema has an excellent mechanism for extensions so use that
- Object-oriented so extensions look like built-in parts of the syntax

Rethinking EPP - part 4

- Real cross-registry support
 - Again, describing not defining data
 - A registry can say “we support X federation”
 - Registrar can then use X federation identifiers and operations
 - Of course these federations don't exist yet

Rethinking EPP - summary

- ❧ Add cryptographic signatures
 - ❧ Bring back some real security
- ❧ Support a local data model
 - ❧ Bring back control of data
- ❧ Support a proper extension mechanism
 - ❧ Bring back control of features
- ❧ Add cross-registry support
 - ❧ Look to the future

NSCP/ DCOMA

- ☞ Currently
 - ☞ BIND - rndc command and config files
 - ☞ NSD - nsdc command and config files
 - ☞ ANS - proprietary XML interface
 - ☞ UltraDNS - proprietary XML interface
 - ☞ PowerDNS - PowerAdmin GUI
- ☞ Different tools, protocols and options

NSCP / DCOMA - why?

- ⌚ Standard way of controlling nameservers
 - ⌚ Manufacturers would have to support
- ⌚ One tool to control many nameservers
 - ⌚ Supports TLD policies of genetic diversity
- ⌚ Greater variety of tools/better quality
- ⌚ Better backwards compatibility
- ⌚ No vendor lock-in
 - ⌚ We can change nameservers at lower cost

DCOMA

- ⌚ Attempt to define functionality for NS management
 - ⌚ Dns COnfiguration Management
 - ⌚ Languishing in IETF DNSOP working group
 - ⌚ Not enough active supporters
 - ⌚ Follows recent IETF pattern of defining requirements then protocol
 - ⌚ Draft at <http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsop-name-server-management-reqs-03>

NSCP - part 1

- ⌚ Proposed protocol to implement DCOMA
 - ⌚ (though actually predates it)
- ⌚ Full command set
 - ⌚ Commands - start, stop, halt etc.
 - ⌚ Zone manipulation - add zone, remove zone, ACL creation, etc.
 - ⌚ Parameters - control nameserver behaviour
 - ⌚ Statistics - obtain information from nameserver
 - ⌚ Zone data - manipulation of small amounts of zone data

NSCP - part 2

- Full object model:
 - Server, Views, ACLs, RRsets, RRs and so on
- Ruled out of scope by dnsop (protocol)
- Needs a home and supporters
- Contact the lead author:
 - Stephen.morris@nominet.org.uk


Phishing URLs

- ☞ Increasingly important information
- ☞ Phishing has direct impact on ccTLDs
 - ☞ Invalid McAfee report impact on .hk reputation
 - ☞ WHOIS data mining by US “security” company Intrusion.com
- ☞ Significant commercial opportunity
- ☞ Yet strong community support and action

Phishing URLs

- Initial data comes from
 - Consumer reports via toolbars/protection systems
 - Spam traps
 - Newly registered domains
- Then processed by
 - Security companies (commercial feed)
 - Anti-Phishing Working Group (free)
 - Local community (free)
 - Registrars
 - Universities
 - Research groups (e.g. CERTs)

Registry DB of Phishing URLs



What now for DNS after DNSSEC

- DNSSEC changes DNS
 - We can trust the answers
 - Greater use/support for TCP
- Certificates and identity?
 - CERT RR - RFC4398 - X.509, OpenPGP, etc
- Geo-location
 - LOC RR - RFC1876 - longitude, latitude, etc

Any questions?

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